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A macroeconomic
perspective of the Western
economy and the financial
crisis
A crisis and a recession does not appear of a sudden: the keys to
each stage of the economic cycle are to be found in previous
periods. This proved to be true once again in the 2007 financial
crisis. The purpose of this article is to show how a long period of
macroeconomic stability, high growth and low interest rates created
the real estate bubble that is at the origin of the crisis. How did
that period of permissive monetary policies, cheap money, real
estate speculation and optimism come about? Is the crisis the
inevitable result of previous developments? And will such
circumstances appear again once the recession is over?
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Introduction1
Neither a crisis nor a recession appears of a
sudden. The key to each stage of an economic
cycle is to be found in previous periods: it is
excess during expansion what renders reces-
sion inevitable. This proved to be true once
again in the 2007 financial crisis: a long period
of macroeconomic stability, high growth and
low interest rates created the real estate bubble
and allowed financial errors that eventually led
to a deep crisis.
The key to each stage of an economic
cycle is to be found in previous
periods: it is excess during expansion
what renders recession inevitable.
This article intends to describe the evolution 
of the global economy during the first years of
the 21st century in order to understand how the
financial crisis and recession came about.
By financial crisis we mean the situation in
which survival of a large number of financial
institutions is in jeopardy to the point that it
may even paralyse the functioning of the whole
financial system. Recession is characterised by
considerable deterioration of variables such as
production, employment and investment; it can
be a consequence of financial crisis but also the
effect of other causes.
We will basically focus on the economy of the
United States, as what has occurred in recent
years cannot be understood unless we have 
a look at it. However, we will also take a
glimpse at other countries as they appear in
our analysis. First we will explain the bullish
years that created the conditions that turned
the crisis possible (or inevitable?). We are not
going to explain the financial crisis or the
recession in detail, nor action taken by gov-
ernments and central banks to counteract it,
which other articles in this Paradigmes issue
deal with; instead, assuming that the reader is
knowledgeable, we will do an exercise of
«economy-fiction» to try to explain in what
setting the world economy will find itself
after the crisis and, more specifically, if the
situation that led to it can occur again.
The setting prior 
to the financial crisis
The years that followed the oil crises in the
1970s and adjustment in the early 1980s were
of «big moderation»: a period of long expansion,
smooth recession and low inflation – though
other variables, such as current account, public
debt and exchange rate were less moderate.
There were also some crises like the 1987 stock
exchange crash, the Japan crisis in the 1990s,
troubles in the European Monetary System
(1992-93), Mexico (1994), the Asian crisis
(1997), that in Brazil and Russia (1998), in
Argentina and the burst of the dotcom bubble
(2001), but generally speaking, economic
 performance was good. The whole of OECD
countries grew at an annual 3% between 1984
and 2006.
The years that followed the oil 
crises in the 1970s and adjustment
in the early 1980s were of
«big moderation»: a period of long
expansion, smooth recession and 
low inflation.
This long time of expansion can be attributed
to the absence of considerable difficulties 
(e.g. oil prices) and especially to low interest
rates that lasted for years, basically out of
two reasons: 1) considerable savings rates all
over the world, not only in traditionally
 austere countries like Japan or Germany, but
also in emerging ones, with China and the oil
producing countries at the forefront, and 
2) the expansive monetary policy of the US.
However, this needs to be further explained,
as it is probably the ultimate cause for the
 current crisis.
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Periods of high growth and abundant liquidity
often end up in increasing inflation. This did
not occur in years of «big moderation», as
labour costs were held back: since the 1980s,
billions of people had been entering the world
market after being kept off by isolation in
communist countries or restrictive policies
in Asian and Latin American ones. This moderate
inflation (2.4% in the US and 1.9% in the euro-
zone in 1995-2007) explains why central banks
did not raise interest rates, which prolonged
economic expansion.
However, this was also the ideal setting to create
bubbles, i.e. price growth of a given asset fun-
damental variables do not justify. Towards the
end of the 1990s the dotcom bubble grew
before bursting in 2000 and causing a recession.
But the Federal Reserve had the recipe to get
out of it as soon as possible: a quick reduction of
interest rates. And so it did: interest rates of
federal funds, those used by the Fed to control
monetary policy, fell from 6.5% to 1.75%
within one year.
Low interest rates encouraged families to
leverage, as well as consumption and hous-
ing demand, thus consolidating recovery. But
the Federal Reserve went on lowering nominal
interest rates down to 1.0% in June 2003,
keeping real rates negative till late 2005,
when it raised doubts on the strength of
recovery and fears of deflation. The expan-
sion phase of the cycle thus became euphoria.
A global bubble in the real estate market
grew: between 1997 and 2007, housing prices
soared a 401% in South Africa, 220% in Ireland,
195% in Spain, 174% in Australia, 150% in
France and Sweden and more than 100% 
in the United States.
This anomalous policy was reproduced in other
countries: the European Central Bank also kept
its interest rates at an excessive low level, perhaps
out of fear that a more restrictive policy could
strengthen the euro too much as it was already
appreciating, and Japan went on maintaining
interest rates between 0 and 0.5% in those
years.
Low interest rates encouraged families
to leverage, as well as consumption
and housing demand. But the Federal
Reserve went on lowering nominal
interest rates.
More expenditure and less savings led to con-
siderable current account debt (the average
 balance between 2002 and 2007 was 5.4% as of
GDP in the US, 5.4% in Australia, 5.8% in
Spain and even higher rates in New Zealand,
Hungary, Portugal and Greece, topped by Iceland
with 11.6%) and abundant resort to foreign
funding, which in the case of the United States
came especially from oil producing countries
and China, which avoided appreciation of its
currency by buying dollars massively. This
external imbalance was the other side of
growth of consumption, building and invest-
ment in owing countries. Low interest rates in
the United States also explain massive depreci-
ation of the dollar (above 65% against the euro
between 2001 and 2007).
An unexpected effect of cheap money was the
move of demand of profitable assets towards
commodity markets. Oil climbed from $20 a
barrel in 1998 to $147 one decade later, and
mineral prices grew by 230% within the same
period. The cause of this development was con-
siderable growth in global demand, led by
China and India and supported by other coun-
tries, both emerging and advanced, but it was
also due to insufficient offer, the reasons of which
were manifold: low oil prices in the 1980s had
discouraged from prospecting and opening new
fields; prospect and exploitation costs had
increased due to technical or environmental
reasons; and finally, most of this investment
had to be done by public companies from pro-
ducing countries that were a considerable
source of income to their governments but did
not play a relevant role in their priorities
regarding expenditure. So all these effects were
completed by diversion of financial resources to
investment in raw materials, looking for that
profitability investors did not get from else-
where. This had also an influence in the oil
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price (as well as in that of other raw materials)
through Saudi Arabia’s price fixing policy.
An unexpected effect of cheap money
was the move of demand of profitable
assets towards commodity markets. 
Oil climbed from $20 a barrel in 1998
to $147 one decade later.
Expansion eventually became generalised:
intensive economic activity drove exports from
and the GDP of emerging countries, which also
benefited from the entry of capital as a result of
low interest rates and the lowering of their risk
premium thanks to strict policies carried out
since the crises in the previous decade.
The other main component of the pre-crisis
setting is financial innovations. Apart from
abundant liquidity and low interest rates, new
opportunities triggering a price growth of a
given asset are needed to create a bubble, and
this usually occurs through some financial
innovation. In the period we are dealing with,
it was the hype of subprime mortgages in the
United States, securitisation and the develop-
ment of a «shadow» financial system what
allowed the bubble to grow, which aggravated
the crisis once it burst. However, as we said
before, let us leave for other articles this sub-
ject and all those related to the development of 
the crisis and action taken by governments and
central banks.
The future framework
How will the macroeconomic setting be like
after the current crisis and recession? Is it
likely that the same conditions having led to
the current situation occur again?
We economists are supposed to be able to
make conditional predictions like «if A occurs
(and all the rest keeps constant), B will hap-
pen». The problem is that we do not know
what A is, because governments and central
banks take new measures when new problems
come up. Besides, nothing is constant. So the
most likely to occur is that under current cir-
cumstances, any attempt at projecting the
future is doomed to fail. Nevertheless, we can
try and give some thoughts we are going
explain now.
In early 2009, governments decided measures
along two lines: first, holding down recession
and fostering recovery, and second, halting the
financial crisis (a third line, preparing the insti-
tutional, regulatory and legal framework of the
financial system for the future is still being stud-
ied). In the first line, monetary policy is not use-
ful under present conditions, so governments
trust tax policy despite the question marks it
raises on its efficacy, the delay with which its
effects will be felt in production and especially
the impact of massive public debt emission
on interest rates and thus on financing of the
private sector.
The near future – maybe the next three years –
will depend on the evolution of the recession
and the effectiveness of governmental meas-
ures. Beyond this timeframe, the global macro-
economic setting we are dealing with will
depend on several factors:
Will a setting with low interest rates occur
again? In the short term, the answer seems
to be yes, given the formidable creation of
global liquidity by central banks. But this
 liquidity remains in the balance of the banks,
where it carries out a mission of caution and will
become unnecessary once the markets recover.
The key will then lie in the capacity and will of
central banks to withdraw it in good time.
 Technically, they should not have any problem
to do it, but the delay, doubts on recovery and
pressure on behalf of less dynamic institutions
and industries may cause a relapse into a situa-
tion of too low interest rates in the short term,
or more probably to accelerated inflation once
the recovery consolidates – although central
banks are supposed to have learned the conse-
quences of a too permissive monetary policy
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for too long time – meaning higher interest
rates in the long term.
A quite new item in the future scenario will be
growth of public expenditure and debt, which
did not play a significant role before the crisis
(except for the contribution to the US current
account). Many governments are now sacrificing
tax discipline to reach immediate recovery of
aggregated demand, but the cost of these
measures will be felt in the medium term.
The most important will be credit becoming
expensive due to growth in global demand of
funding and the risk premium: once again, high
interest rates in the long term.
Are we going to see again high growth rates
as in recent years? Probably not for a long time.
On the demand side, consumption will moderate,
at least in those countries most affected by
recession such as Spain. Families will need to
reduce leveraging, which will mean a stronger
trend towards saving, at least for some years. If
interest rates are higher, the demand of consumer
credits will also be lower as already mentioned.
Apathy in the real estate market will last some
more years until the unsold housing stock is
reduced.
Many governments are now sacrificing tax
 discipline to reach immediate recovery of aggre-
gated demand, but the cost of these measures
will be felt in the medium term. The most
 important will be credit becoming expensive.
Investment demand will also slow down due to
smaller growth of consumption and higher interest
rates. Regarding exports, if global growth remains
low, they will not be a big driver unless the com-
petitive capacity of the country recovers by means
of cost moderation, use of its competitive advan-
tages and innovation.
The structure of production is on constant
change. After the crisis, the real estate, the
building and the finance sectors will need to
come back to a more sustainable size. Whether
other branches take over will depend on the
structure and conditions of each country, espe-
cially on its capacity to create entrepreneurial
initiatives and its flexibility to move resources
to branches with a bright future. Hence the
importance of structural reform: competition,
deregulation, labour market flexibility, fostering
human capital and innovation, etc.
In early 2009, governments decided
measures along two lines: first,
holding down recession and fostering
recovery, and second, halting the
financial crisis.
In the long term, a country’s key to growth is
its potential growth rate, which depends on
two variables: labour offer (which will probably
be less dynamic due to the impact of recession
on migration) and its productivity, which in
turn depends on variables such as physical and
human capital allocations, technology and ability
to innovate. Once the recession is over, many
of these variables will resume their previous
trend, although some significant change is
likely to occur: for instance, regulation in the
finance industry will increase, interest rates and
risk premiums will be higher, the credit volume
will not grow at the same pace as before and
capital creation will thus be lower. To put it
simple, the capacity to grow will probably be
more moderate than in times when housing
pushed the economy.
Will global imbalance be reduced, and more
specifically the gap between savings in some
countries and expenditure in others? Probably
yes, but to a limited extent. In countries having
now a negative current account, higher family
savings will be compensated by government
expenditure; the result may be ambiguous.
Adjustment will depend on exchange rate
movements and the pace of income loss
(in Spain, recession is almost the only way
of adjusting the foreign balance sheet). The
evolution of exchange rates is hardly foresee-
able beyond likely depreciation of the dollar to
attract the necessary funds for US stimulation
policies and to moderate their current account
debt.
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On the side of countries having a surplus now,
the savings rate in emerging ones will be
reduced by recession and probably be lower in
the future if, for instance, consumption growth
accelerates in China. Oil producing countries
will reduce their surplus in the short term as
well, though it can increase again in the longer
term, as we will see further on. However, the
map of fund supplying and demanding coun-
tries is likely to change. Expansive tax policies
in many countries will require net capital
imports, which will only be possible if their
 current account is negative, which in turn
will contribute to higher interest rates at global
scale. And if global demand of secure assets
(public debt) keeps high, American current
account debt is likely to be high again without
posing a problem to the world economy.
The capacity to grow will probably be
more moderate than in times when
housing pushed the economy.
The oil price will recover when demand also
does, and then scarcity in offer will become
acute, aggravated by the present period of low
prices and insufficient investment in prospect
and exploitation. Hence it is probable that the
trend towards more expensive oil accelerates in
the future.
In recent discussions, forecasts have been
made that belong to economy-fiction: for
instance, dismantling of the eurozone or the
possibility that some country leaves it. This is
very unlikely because the cost on credibility of
the own policies and on the own risk prime
would be prohibitive. A different thing is that
the euro countries are able to implement new
policies, from liberalising their markets to single
or more coordinated mechanisms of financial
monitoring and regulation: dynamism in
Europe will still be reduced.
The relevance of the United States in the world
economy is shrinking, and this trend is likely to
continue, but not to the benefit of Europe or
Japan, as their strength will not increase out of
the recession, but to that of emerging powers,
especially China and India, although there
are some major uncertainties about both: political
sustainability, social peace and pacific transition
to democracy (if it occurs) of the Chinese regime,
social, economic and political imbalance in India,
Russia’s decline, etc.
The 2007 financial crisis was not a crisis of
capitalism despite the reactions it caused. Albeit
discredited, it is still the best available option
as of now. Recession is likely to stress on
 economic protectionism, interventionism and
nationalism, but this will only hamper global
growth.
The 2007 financial crisis was not a
crisis of capitalism despite the
reactions it caused. Albeit discredited,
it is still the best available option as
of now.
One of the most affected branches by the 2007
crisis will be economics. It is not about returning
to Keynes or not but about questioning the
assumptions of our models. We do not know
what new approaches will be like, but there will
doubtless be important changes.
Conclusions
Few experts were able to anticipate the current
recession. And this is reasonable enough:
 policies made up to 2007, not all too contractive,
were no apparent reason for what has happened.
But we did not count on a new factor: the
financial crisis. The latter was foreseen by some
who noticed that the growth of real estate
credit was unsustainable and the balance sheet
of many financial institutions was bearing new
risks. But it was not at all easy, based on the
problems of some countries or institutions,
to predict a systemic and global crisis, at least
until delinquency of high-risk mortgages
started increasing in early 2007.
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In this article we have discussed the macroeco-
nomic and financial setting the global economy
was moving in and its relation with the crisis.
Once things have happened, it is easy to under-
stand how low interest rates, plentiful liquidity,
the creation of benefit opportunities leading to
bubbles and political errors triggered first a
financial crisis and then a deep recession. Never-
theless, the important issue is not to find culprits
but especially to introduce necessary reform to
prevent such a crisis from occurring again in the
future. However, given the history of the last two
centuries, the best prophecy we can make is that
there will be a crisis again because man is the
only animal stumbling several times over the
same stone. The most we can expect is that they
take a very long time to stumble again, and that
the consequences from this will be less negative
than in the present crisis.
Given the history of the last two
centuries, the best prophecy we can
make is that there will be a crisis
again because man is the only animal
stumbling several times over the same
stone.
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